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ABSTRACT
Near Field Communication (NFC) is an emerging close
range, low bandwidth, induction based communication
standard. It is already and will be more broadly integrated
tightly with modern smartphones, devices and operating
systems. Payment services, setup of high-bandwidth
connections, information sharing and identity verication
become possible by just touching two NFC devices together.
This paper tries to give an overview over how NFC
technology works, what some of its current and potential
applications are and which risks and exploits come along
with its simplicity.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Near Field Communication (NFC) is a consumer-oriented
wireless technology using magnetic elds and induction
to communicate data over a distance of centimeters at
low bandwidth. It is backed by the NFC Forum,
consisting of more than 160 members including industry
heavy-weights like Samsung, Sony and NXP. They push and
certify integration of NFC technology in modern consumer
electronics like smartphones and operating systems like
Android and Windows 8. Current applications include
payment and ticketing by just waving your phone, the
setup of Bluetooth or Wi-Fi connections between devices
by touching them together and embedding of information or
device congurations in passive entities, so called NFC tags.
The following will give an overview over the history and
technology behind NFC (2), showcase the breadth of current
and future applications (3) as well as discuss risks, attack
vectors and existing exploits (4).
2. HISTORY AND TECHNOLOGY
In 2004 ISO/IEC standard 18092 \Near Field
Communication - Interface and Protocol (NFCIP-1)"
[2] specied a technology for exchange of information and
telecommunications. It is based on and expands on existing
RFID standards for contactless cards by ISO/IEC (ISO/IEC
14443 [3]) and Sony (Felicity Card/FeliCa [4], based on JIS
X 6319-4 [5]). Implementations and applications in various
forms and devices based on this standard are backed and
certied by the NFC Forum, an industry consortium which
came to life the same year. The NFC Forum now includes
more than 160 members like electronics manufacturers
Samsung and Sony, chip providers NXP and Broadcom
and even nancial services companies Visa and Mastercard.
Mid-2006 initial specications for a data exchange format
(NDEF, see 2.3) and record types - the rst few instances
being text, URIs and smart posters - were announced [6].
Both prior standards ISO/IEC 14443 and FeliCa
dierentiate between dedicated reading and writing
devices and integrated circuit cards. The cards are mainly
passive objects and do not have a power source of their own.
The used elds operate in the globally available, unlicensed
ISM
1 band of 13.56 MHz and require small distances in the
range of centimeters between the reader and the contactless
card.
According to the new ISO/IEC 18092 standard [2], NFC
devices operate in the same ISM band of 13.56 MHz and
are required to be compatible with ISO/IEC 14443 and
FeliCa. Communication involves an active initiator device
generating a magnetic eld in close proximity to a passive
target device, typically at about four centimeters or less.
All devices by default are in target mode and wait for an
incoming command by an initiator. If a eld is noticed by a
target device, it will manipulate it to transmit information
back to the initiator. This mode is similar to the reader
and card scheme in ISO/IEC 14443 and FeliCa and is called
passive mode. One should note that using special resonant
circuitry a passive target device may be built which does not
require its own power source similar to existing contactless
cards in various form factors. These are called tags and are
discussed in more detail later on (see section 3.1).
In contrast to the previous standards, however, any NFC
device may opt to become the active component, the
initiator. This active mode enables both devices to take
turns in generating their own elds while the other listens
for data, eectively establishing a half-duplex connection.
Both the passive and active mode provide data rates of
106, 212 or 424 kbit/s using the Manchester coding scheme
with amplitude shift keying for modulation for all mode and
data rate combinations. Active mode at 106 kbit/s is an
exception, it uses a form of Miller coding (both codings are
described in [2]).
NFC connections as specied by ISO/IEC 18092 themselves
1Various frequency bands widely reserved for Industrial,
Science and Medical use
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35NFC ZigBee Bluetooth (2.1) WLAN (802.11ac)
Range < 10cm < 100m < 100m < 250m
Data rate <424 kbit/s <250 kbit/s <2.1 Mbit/s <866.7 Mbit/s
Network size 2 2**64 8 2007
Frequency band 13.56 MHz 868/915 MHz, 2.4 GHz 2.4 GHz 2.4/5 GHz
Table 1: NFC compared to other wireless technologies. [7]
do not require any form of encryption. It is of the
discretion of the implementing applications to provide
any layer of security, which might not be as reliable
on a application-to-application basis compared to built-in
security. In addition the application layer may be more
prone to vulnerabilities and outside inuences especially
considering an active NFC device always listening and
reacting to incoming commands as mentioned before.
Serious privacy concerns may arise if personal information
can simply be read from a NFC-equipped mobile phone due
to sloppy applications handing out data without approval.
Or even programs being executed resulting in the infection
of the users device. Therefore the last chapter (4) will shed
more light on possible and existing attacks.
2.1 Comparison
As Near Field Communication is based on RFID technology
it shares similar properties. Taking a closer look at
RFID, it is designed to read data from tags or cards via
radio-frequency (RF) electromagnetic elds for the purposes
of identication or tracking of objects or people. Tags
and cards are always passive, only reading devices active.
Communication, however, may occur on a wider variety of
frequencies, including the 13.56 MHz ISM band NFC uses.
More importantly RFID is capable of operating without
line-of-sight making it feasible for dierent automation
tasks, like the scanning of stacks of crates passing a RFID
reader equipped warehouse gate. In comparison NFC is
restricted to very short distances but allows devices to
function either as, in RFID terms, a reader or tag/card.
[8]
In the following multiple other existing wireless technologies,
namely ZigBee, Bluetooth and WLAN are described and
compared to NFC as listed in table 1.
ZigBee is a wireless technology designed to support
signicantly higher ranges with improved maximum data
rates requiring only minimal hardware. Like RFID it is
mainly used in commercial applications, but seldom in
consumer products. ZigBee allows to interconnect devices
into a mesh like network while consuming as little energy as
possible. It extends the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, operating
mainly on 2.4 GHz, and may support thousands of devices
in one network, for example to report sensor measurements
or automate devices through remote commands. [9]
Bluetooth, specied by the Bluetooth SIG
2, is similar to
ZigBee. It, however, restricts the device architecture to one
master and up to seven slave devices. More devices may be
linked into this Personal Area Network, albeit in a passive,
parked mode. The resulting piconet was supposed to get
2http://www.bluetooth.com
rid of cables required to connect computer accessories like
printers or digital cameras. Nowadays, Bluetooth is included
in pretty much every mobile handset and is commonly used
for le transfers or spontaneous device networks with data
rates signicantly higher than NFC at a larger range in the
ball bark of meters (see table1). However, setup is far more
complicated and time consuming requiring pairing and the
exchange of secrets. [10]
WLAN was designed to extend the range of LANs to
mobile devices like laptops. It is specied as the IEEE
802.11 standard which has been extended numerous times
to include more features, MIMO support and higher
bandwidth. As the n extension is becoming the default in
current mobile phones and access points, 802.11ac carries
forward with even more supported antennas and even higher
bandwidth (see table1) exceeding Bluetooth and NFC by
orders of magnitude. With 802.11ac WLAN will transition
completely to the 5 GHz band away from 2.4 GHz which
has become somewhat crowded: Bluetooth, ZigBee and
many other wireless technologies use it. Of all presented
technologies WLAN has the highest possible range for
consumer equipment in the realm of hundreds of meters.
It also supports connection encryption out of the box. [10]
2.2 Operating modes
According to the NFC Forum there exist three basic
modes of operation for NFC Forum devices: reader/writer
mode, peer-to-peer mode and card emulation mode. In
reader/writer mode a device is able to read or write NFC
tags as specied by the NFC Forum. These include smart
posters or tags with embedded text, URLs or signatures.
This mode is conform with ISO/IEC 14443 and the FeliCa
standard.
Peer-to-peer mode allows devices to exchange small chunks
of data with each other, examples would be setup parameters
for Bluetooth or Wi-Fi connections or virtual business cards.
This behavior is newly specied by ISO/IEC standard
18092.
At last there is a card emulation mode which gives NFC
devices the capability to emulate traditional, contactless,
read-only RFID smart cards. This allows NFC devices
to integrate with existing legacy RFID infrastructure,
like ticketing systems in public transport, without any
modications of the legacy system.
2.3 NFC Data Exchange Format
To store and exchange information the NFC Forum has
specied the NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF, [11]). It
is a binary message format allowing data exchange between
NFC Forum devices or between a NFC Forum device and
one of four NFC Forum tag types (type 1 through 4, [12]).
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36There exist NFC Forum Well-known Types, specied
according to the NFC Forum Record Type Denition
(RTD) specication [15]. These are simple URNs using the
namespace identier \nfc", prexing \wkt" for well-known
types or \ext" for self-dened types. A sample URN
would be \urn:nfc:wkt:Sp" for the NFC Forum Smart
Poster record type or \urn:nfc:ext:example.com:foo" for
a self-dened type. The Smart Poster RTD [18] is
based on the Text RTD [16] and URI RTD [17] in
combination with actions that may trigger the launch
of a web browser or sending of a SMS message.
The Signature RTD [19] denes additional signature
elds and suitable algorithms to allow verication of
the authenticity and integrity of records inside a NDEF
message, but employs no restrictions on the use of
a certication architecture nor requires one at all.
There also exists a Generic Control RTD [20], it is, however,
deprecated and will be removed on or after August 9, 2012.
A NDEF message itself can include an unlimited amount
of application-dened payloads in so called records. Each
message is started with a record agged as MB (Message
Begin) and ends with a record agged as ME (Message End).
NDEF messages can be nested by including them inside a
record of an existing NDEF message.
NDEF Message
R1, MB=1 ... Ri ... Rn, ME=1
Figure 1: Example of an NDEF message with
multiple records [11].
In addition to several ags providing support for chunking
payloads over records (CF) or signaling very short records
(SR), each record species the length of its payload as well
as its type and an optional payload identier which may be
used to establish links between payloads in other records (see
gure 2). Payload types may be formatted as NFC Forum
specied Record Type Denitions as mentioned above, any
MIME type as specied by RFC 2046 [13], URIs [14] and
various others. When encoded in a NDEF message the
namespace identier and prex of a Well-known type are
dropped and represented by appropriate Type Name Format
(TNF) eld values in the record header. However, all types
are understood as mere guidelines for overlying applications
on how to parse payloads.
3. APPLICATIONS
According to the NFC Forum [1] NFC technology is or may
be used in the areas of
 Access control,
 Consumer electronics,
 Healthcare,
 Information collection and exchange,
 Loyalty and coupons,
 Payments and
 Transport.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
MB ME CF SR IL TNF
Type length
Payload length 3
Payload length 2
Payload length 1
Payload length 0
ID length
Type
ID
Payload
Figure 2: NDEF Record layout. IL = ID length is
present ag [11].
In general NFC is predestined to become a widely deployed
technology as it requires only simple active hardware and
can use cheap, easily mountable integrated circuit tags.
Consumers will have NFC functionality embedded in their
regular phones and setup and usage is as simple as bringing
devices into close proximity of another. Applications on top
may add value ranging from automation to payments.
As applications are endless we will focus on a few interesting
areas: passive NFC tags (3.1), sharing between devices (3.2),
nancial services (3.3) - which will probably have the biggest
(monetary) impact - as well as identication documents like
tickets (3.4).
3.1 Tags
Storing pieces of information inside small, exible circuitry
embedded into stickers, little plastic shells or paper is one
of the main visible use cases for NFC. These tags may be
read by a NFC device, supporting the NFC Forum specied
reader/writer mode, close to them and may contain simple
text or URLs up to complex application specic data like
conguration instructions. The NFC Forum species four
dierent tag types, simply named NFC Forum Type 1 Tag
through 4. Type 1 and 2 are based on the ISO/IEC
14443A contactless card standard [3] and are read- and
re-writable. Type 1 tags store at minimum 96 bytes, Type
2 tags at minimum 48 bytes. Both at most 2 kbyte. Type
3 is basically the JIS X 6319-4 [5] contactless smart card
standard used by FeliCa from Sony [4] which includes an
additional read-only mode with available memory varying up
to a maximum of 1 MByte while allowing multiple services
on one card. Similarly Type 4 tags support multiple services,
read-only mode and vary in memory size up to 32 KByte per
service. However, they are based on the ISO/IEC 14443A/B
standard.
Sony was the rst company to oer its NFC tags, called
Xperia SmartTags [21], as a consumer oriented accessory
for their Android smartphones. Internet and some brick
and mortar stores start to catch on to the trend and are
oering tags with more memory in form factors ranging
from stickers, classic card sizes and wrist bands to Sony
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3. Most of them make use
of NXPs MIFARE chip series which are compatible with
ISO/IEC 14443 [3], read- and writable by any NFC Forum
device in reader/writer mode. Common use cases include
mode or prole switching of a phone on touching a tag. For
example putting your phone near a tag in your car may
start the navigation app and enable Bluetooth pairing to the
infotainment system. To write and react to the tags Sony
provides a companion app, however there exist multiple free
alternatives which support a wider range of tag types and
commands
45.
3.2 Sharing
As the rise of Web 2.0 technology has shown social
integration like sharing content between people is highly
popular. Using NFC Forum devices in peer-to-peer mode
enables a dead simple way of sharing content. Contact
information, website URLs or small les are quickly passed
on by a simple, intuitive action: touching devices together.
For this particular purpose the NFC Forum dened a Simple
NDEF Exchange Protocol (SNEP) [22] which uses the
connection-oriented mode of the transport protocol Logical
Link Control Protocol (LLCP) providing sequenced and
guaranteed data delivery. It is also dened by the NFC
Forum [23]. SNEP is a versioned request-response protocol
between a client and a server. A client may send SNEP
request messages to store (Put) or retrieve (Get) NDEF
messages from a server over a LLCP data link connection.
Notably Android Beam [24], introduced by Google with
Android 4.0 (Ice Cream Sandwich) in late 2011, is a
peer-to-peer data exchange protocol for Android devices
based on SNEP. It also supports Androids own, older
NDEF Push protocol as a fallback. The sending user has
to run the Android application he wants to share data
from in the foreground, the receiving device needs to be
unlocked and on its home screen. On touching the two
devices together the sending device will show a \Touch to
Beam"conrmation button allowing to transmit the desired
information. Android Beam can be used by any application
implementing its API. For example the built-in People app
shares contacts, the Browser app shares URLs. Upon
completion, the appropriate application will automatically
be launched on the receiving device to handle the shared
data.
To share bigger les like high-resolution photos or videos
NFCs highest data rate of 424 kbit/s is barely sucient.
To work around this limitation, with Android 4.1,
Google introduced establishing a separate, faster transport
connection like Bluetooth via Android Beam taking over
data transfers from NFC after successful connection
6. The
NFC Forum happens to have a specication of exactly this
process titled Connection Handover [25], initially released
in 2008, revised in 2010. In addition to a \Negotiated
3XDA developers, Where to Buy NFC Tags http://forum.
xda-developers.com/showthread.php?t=1662367
4NFC Task Launcher https://play.google.com/store/
apps/details?id=com.jwsoft.nfcactionlauncher
5NFC TagWriter by NXP https://play.google.com/
store/apps/details?id=com.nxp.nfc.tagwriter
6Android 4.1 APIs https://developer.android.com/
about/versions/android-4.1.html#Connectivity
Handover" like Android Beam uses, it denes a \Static
Handover" where parameters are stored and read o a
passive tag.
Looking further back in time, Nokia was the rst company
to integrate NFC into a consumer purchasable phone in
January 2007: the Nokia 6131. They showcased interaction
with smart posters and sending images over to a digital
picture frame
7. In June 2011 they introduced their N9
smartphone [26] with the MeeGo operating system featuring
tight integration with NFC in concert with a set of
NFC-enabled wireless speakers (Nokia Play 360 [27]). By
touching the phone to the speakers a Bluetooth connection
would automatically be established and music would play
on the speakers.
Meanwhile, in addition to Android and MeeGo, NFC
peer-to-peer capability has been integrated into Microsoft's
Windows Phone operating system as well as directly into
Microsoft's new touch-focused tablet and desktop operating
system Windows 8 [28]. In any case the focus has been on
friction-less sharing between devices, on occasion handing
over to a high-throughput connection when necessary to
support larger data transfers.
3.3 Financial services
One of the biggest areas of interest, at least from an
industries perspective, is nancial services: paying with your
phone acting as a digital wallet. As of 2012 there are three
approaches on paying with NFC: you carry a NFC enabled
banking or credit card, your phone includes a Secure SIM
which handles encryption and authentication over the NFC
interface, or you install an application which handles all
payment processing.
There are currently two competing major application-based
payment solutions: Google Wallet [29] and ISIS [30]. So far
these are only available in the United States of America.
Both require the installation of an application on your
phone, then credit or debit cards have to be linked to
their services to make them available for checking out
within the app. On checkout the app is simply openend,
unlocked with a PIN, and the phone placed on the merchants
terminal to complete the transaction. Google Wallet tries to
monetize their free service with Google Oers, displaying
deals at the current shopping location. It works with
any Mastercard PayPass [31] or Google Wallet enabled
terminal with Mastercard claiming hundreds of thousands
of supported locations world-wide. Non-partner credit cards
may still be linked, but all transactions are handled through
a virtual Mastercard. ISIS on the other hand is announced
to support any NFC-enabled device of the three partners
at&t, T-Mobile USA and Verizon launching in summer of
2012 and later. In contrast to Google Wallet, ISIS will only
support some major cards directly, forcing users to rely on
a prepaid card option, which can be charged in advance.
However, ISIS is being backed by mobile phone providers
which may come in as an advantage as Google Wallet is
currently simply blocked on all Verizon phones while ISIS
is readied for release [32]. ISIS is scheduled for a limited
7NFC in action http://www.nearfield.org/2007/01/
video-of-6131-nfc-phone-in-use
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Notably, as of September 2012 Mastercard has released an
Android and BlackBerry SDK for their contactless payments
product PayPass to enable any NFC-equipped device to pay
through their service stepping into direct competition with
Wallet and ISIS
8.
On the bright side, the competing standards for payment
systems may soon be on the verge of getting unied or
at least made compatible as the Electronic Transactions
Association - a global trade association representing more
than 500 companies including Google, ISIS, Visa and
Mastercard - announced the launch of a Mobile Payments
Committee on August 9, 2012 [34] including all four major
US mobile carriers. At rst, members promised to hold
monthly meetings to update each other on their activities to
slowly expand cooperation with the nal goal of achieving
industry wide solutions at some point.
Meanwhile as of April 2012, the Deutsche Kreditwirtschaft,
a union of all major banks in Germany, has rolled out
\girogo" [35]. A huge one-year pilot project covering
the region of Hannover plus the cities of Braunschweig
and Wolfsburg featuring NFC-enabled banking cards, the
\girocard". It allows payments of up to 20 Euros with a
swipe over a terminal without any PIN or signature. On
the downside, the card has to be charged in advance with
as much as 200 Euros via an ATM or a merchant checkout
terminal secured by PIN. Single transactions will also not be
visible on bank statements. The project has support from a
big German grocery store, a gas company and various small
retail chains totaling in a few hundred locations so far [36].
At last Microsoft announced [37] to integrate their payment
solution in the upcoming Windows Phone 8 operating
system. Their \Wallet" will require the phone to carry a
Secure SIM element for paying, which is a conventional
SIM packing additional functionality for encryption and
authentication. It is handed out by the wireless carriers
themselves. When transactions are triggered via the phones
NFC interface further communication with a terminal will
happen directly with the Secure SIM element avoiding
the potentially less secure application environment of the
phones operating system. \Wallet" will also have support
for coupons, similar to Google Wallet, and store virtual
boarding passes.
On a broader scale, the GSM Association announced
its \Pay-Buy Mobile" initiative as early as 2007 [38] for
embedding payment solutions inside SIM cards. Following
years of trials, May 2010 saw the roll out of NFC services
in Nice, France, for information access, public transport
ticketing, coupons, loyalty programs and contactless
payments in cooperation with major banks. More cities are
planned. Similar undertakings made NFC services available
in South Korea, Turkey, The United Kingdom and Tanzania.
Mobile provider Orange is in the process of deploying NFC
technology to various European countries. 2012 will see
further projects by telecom providers KPN, T-Mobile and
Vodafone in cooperation with banks in the Netherlands and
8http://www.mastercard.com/mobile/mobile-paypass.
html
as previously mentioned the release of ISIS in the US [39].
Several network operators like Deutsche Telekom, Orange
and Telenor have promised through GSMA to launch NFC
services throughout the world in 2012 [40].
3.4 Ticketing and Identiﬁcation
Ticketing in public transport or sporting events, access
control to restricted areas and embedding in identity
documents are further applications for NFC technology.
Public transport companies are already using or at least
experimenting, access control and identity documents are
mainly still promoted by the NFC Forum [41]. In both
areas various RFID solutions, like Transport for London's
Oyster
9, have been in use for several years using chips
like NXPs MIFARE Classic smart card [42]. Biometric
contactless readable passports are used in multiple countries
around the world including the United States and Germany
[43]. Moving public transport systems like Oyster over to
NFC provides the freedom to freely exchange cards with
customers phones. Due to security requirements, long
standardization processes and small renewal cycles this will
likely not happen for passports or other federal identity
documents anytime soon. Similar concerns and missing
standards hinder health care applications, like a virtual
patient le linked in a personal NFC-enabled device which
could provide relevant health data in a critical situation to
speed up and reduce errors during care.
As for public transport, Deutsche Bahn oers their
Touch&Travel program in Germany since November 2011.
By scanning so called Touchpoints passengers can determine
start and end of a journey and be automatically charged
for the traveled distance. Showing the ticket to train
personnel is realized via the passengers NFC phone interface
in combination with an installable app [44]. Transport
of London already trialed NFC phone replacements for its
Oyster cards with high customer satisfaction, but to this
date is waiting for Secure SIM based solutions to match the
speed of the traditional Oyster, MIFARE Classic powered,
smart card [45].
4. RISKS, ATTACK VECTORS AND
EXPLOITS
As with many wireless communication technologies NFC is
not invulnerable, despite its short range. Basic connections
as specied by ISO/IEC 18092 using the NFCIP-1 protocol
[2] are unencrypted and there are no checks for authenticity.
Applications on top of NFC are expected to handle
encryption and authentication by themselves. Notably,
for authentication the NFC Forum already provides a
Signature RTD specication [19] to embed signatures in
NDEF messages.
4.1 Eavesdropping
As a wireless technology NFC is especially prone to
eavesdropping. Despite connections occurring at a range of
about four centimeters attackers might still exploit special
circumstances and use specialized hardware to listen in
on a connection. Similar attacks already exist for RFID
contactless cards, in particular those using ISO/IEC 14443
9https://oyster.tfl.gov.uk
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using active mode, so both devices are taking turns in
generating their own elds, eavesdropping distances of up
to 10m may be possible. In passive mode, where the target
responds by modulating the initiators eld, the range of
attack drops signicantly to around 1m [47].
4.2 Denial of Service
The simplest form of attack prohibits the use of the
device or disturbs communication. As each device reacts
to an incoming signal in some form, may it be a user
interface requiring interaction, an attacker might spam
the device with empty tag signals to make it unusable.
The only solution is the inclusion of an o switch to
disable NFC altogether [48]. Otherwise, communication
might be prohibited by disturbing the data ow through
transmitting at NFC frequencies with the correct timing.
This would result in scrambled signals the receiving device
is unable to decode. The attack just requires tting
hardware and sucient knowledge of the used modulation
and coding. However, NFC devices may easily detect such
active corruptions as they require signicantly more power
on the attackers eld [47].
4.3 Data modiﬁcation
To actually modify data more thought has to be put in
how the signals are modulated and coded so data still
appears valid to the receiving device. Attacks occur on the
bit level, switching single 1s to 0s and vice versa. When
using the modied Miller coding only certain bits may be
ipped. However, for almost all modes and data rates
Manchester coding is used (see 2), allowing to modify any
bit of the communication [47]. Prevention involves checking
for third-party eld inuences and stopping communication
on detecting any (which NFC devices do by default as
specied by NFCIP-1), or using an encrypted channel on a
higher layer. There exists an ISO/IEC standard describing
NFC-SEC to already provide security on the data link layer
complementing application layer security [49].
4.4 Relay attack
A relay attack is executed by sitting in the middle of two
communicating parties and simply \relaying" requests and
responses eectively making oneself invisible to either party
(see gure 3). Relay attacks exist already for RFID systems
and have been perfected to work with regular NFC phones
by just installing specic pieces of software. An attacker
would require two phones to act as proxies connected to each
other with a high-speed link such as Bluetooth. One proxy
device interfaces with the NFC token or device of a victim
functioning as a proxy-reader. It forwards all messages over
the high-speed link to the second proxy device imitating
a NFC token to interface with the actual NFC reader,
acting as proxy-token. Relaying even allows circumventing
dynamic authentication on newer NFC card models as using
the relay link introduces only small delays still accepted by
current card readers. This attack concerns any ISO/IEC
14443 implementing contactless system, many, not NFC,
of which are widely in use like the previously mentioned
NXP MIFARE products. Possible countermeasures include
aborting the communication if round trip times or the
location of the pairing device are not as expected. For this
purpose it has been suggested to tap into positioning via
GPS or cellular networks as present in modern smartphones
[50].
Proxy Communication
(Bluetooth, WLAN)
NFC
Proxy Token
Reader
NFC
Proxy Reader
Token
Figure 3: Schematic of a relay attack using a
contactless smartcard, two NFC equipped phones
and a reader terminal.
4.5 Others
Unlike technical attacks there still remains the risk of simply
losing the NFC-enabled banking card or phone, with the
phone being unencrypted or only secured via a weak PIN
opening up abuse by third parties. Authentication should be
handled by a separate factor to prevent any of those issues.
Phishing by replacing original tags or readers with malicious
units can be avoided by signing the content of exchanged
messages [48], for example using the Signature RTD as
specied by the NFC Forum [19]. Man-in-the-Middle
attacks are practically impossible as either initiator or target
are able to detect additional elds by a third party as
mentioned before [47].
4.6 Implementation vulnerabilities
Attack surfaces do not only exist within the technology
but also in implementations and attached services.
Vulnerabilities in software handling or parsing NFC
messages may open up access to sensitive data or a whole
device. An example exploit was demonstrated by Charlie
Miller at the Black Hat 2012 conference [51] which can
take control of a Nokia N9 running MeeGo or a Galaxy
Nexus running the Android 4.0 mobile operating system.
Both operating systems accept incoming data beamed from
the attackers device or tag and then automatically open a
malicious web page or a modied le in a vulnerable app.
Protective measures include modifying apps to let the user
always conrm the triggered action before executing it.
5. CONCLUSION
Near Field Communication is on its way to become an
essential part of our daily lives. It provides simple
means of making information available by using NFC tags
embeddable everywhere one can think, readable with the
NFC-enabled mobile device in your pocket. Sharing of text,
websites or setting up Bluetooth or Wi-Fi connections for
large le transfers or advanced interaction is as far away as
touching two devices. Waving your credit card or phone
at checkout makes paying a new experience. However,
certain risks are associated with mostly unencrypted data
transfers, security holes in still young software libraries or
by actual theft. Communication in the range of centimeters
may appear to make exploitation dicult, but it is very
much possible. As of 2015 every second smartphone may
be equipped with the technology [52], standards for better
security and interoperability will likely emerge. Near Field
Communication is going mainstream, for the better or worse.
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